

## List of Detained Vessels 2020

Ship	PSC State	PSC Port	Detention Date	Ship Age	Detainable Deficiencies
Ship No. 1	Indonesia	Sungai Pakning	15-Jan-2020	11	1. Sequential test for emergency generator failure. 2. Fire door to emergency fire pump defective.
Ship No. 2	Australia	Botany	22-Jan-2020	8	1. SMS fails to ensure that the serious multiple breaches of the hours of work and ISMC/S9 rest as reflected in Deficiency No.3 is investigated and remedial action taken to rectify the breach.
Ship No. 3	Australia	Fremantle	29-Jan-2020	13	1. Emergency fire pump to pressurise fire main not demonstrated - fire main defective. 2. With reference to above deficiency no. 1 to 7 (Code 17 & 30), they are objective evidence that the vessel and equipment not maintain between surveys.
Ship No. 4	Russia	Novorossiysk	3-Feb-2020	13	1. Exhaust ventilation from engine room-remote SOLAS closing wire - waisted CH11 out, not closing properly, flanges heavy corroded. 2. VDR bridge alarm unit - not working. 3. Stowage of liferaft SOLAS P.S. corroded through CH.111 fix damaged.
Ship No. 5	Australia	Gladstone	5-Feb-2020	9	1. SMS as implemented does not ensure that vessel undertakes sea passages with due regards to navigational safety, protection of environments and local & international rules/regulations as evidenced by above deficiencies 6-13; that vessel maintains ship's critical equipment & machinery as evidenced by deficiencies 1-5.
Ship No. 6	Australia	Port Kembla	7-Feb-2020	11	1. The SMS has failed to ensure the vessel is maintained as deficiencies 5, 7 10, 12, 15, 24, 25, 31. The SMS has failed to ensure the vessel is prepared for an emergency as per deficiencies 2, 3, 8, 11 and 13 . The SMS has failed to ensure the vessel adequately resourced as per deficiencies 1, 23, 29 and 32.
Ship No. 7	Australia	Bunbury	12-Feb-2020	11	1. Engine room fire dampers - port forward, port aft and starboard aft defective. 2. The above code 30 & 17 deficiencies (item 1 to 20) are objective evidence that ship and equipment are not maintain between surveys. 3. With reference to all of the above deficiencies, except 21 are objective evidence that the Company's safety management system as implemented onboard is not effective in maintenance of ship and equipment.
Ship No. 8	Australia	Port Hedland	21-Feb-2020	6	1. Freefall lifeboat release system defective.
Ship No. 9	Australia	Port Hedland	23-Mar-2020	7	1. Fire dampers for engine room ventilation fan No.2 and 3 defective.
Ship No. 10	Australia	Port Hedland	10-Apr-2020	8	1. Freefall lifeboat release system defective.
Ship No. 11	USA	Boston	11-May-2020	9	1. The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. PSCO discovered numerous items that holistically demonstrated a general lack of maintenance on board including, a ruptured fire hose, and unserviceable firefighting suit, an inoperable fire door, electrical hazards and a leaking hydraulic ram on a cargo hatch. Recommend an external ISM audit.
Ship No. 12	Australia	Geelong	18-May-2020	20	1. Port and starboard life boats on-load release defective.
Ship No. 13	Russia	Novorossiysk	23-May-2020	19	1. Fire alarm panel on bridge zone (014) isolated - Disable.
Ship No. 14	Canada	Montreal	28-May-2020	7	1. At the time of inspection the oil filtering equipment is not working.
Ship No. 15	Ukraine	Yuzhnyi	30-May-2020	8	1. SOPEP procedures - During observation of environmental pollution master of M/V Aqua Splendor not informed ports authorities a/p SOPEP. - required for ISM audit from flag administration or R.O. till vessel departure from P. Yuzhnyi.
Ship No. 16	Russia	Novorossiysk	31-May-2020	9	1. Fire system of engine room protective grids corroded, fastening corroded, damaged. 2. Ventilation system of battery room outside cover through corroded, funnel corroded, damaged. 3. drums for mooring ropes corroded, handles damaged. 4. Freefall lifeboat one of two emergency battery empty (indicators of density).
Ship No. 17	Ukraine	Odessa	6-Jun-2020	6	1. Emergency Generator - manual start not presented.
Ship No. 18	Indonesia	Tanjung Priok	13-Jun-2020	10	1. Engine room ventilation damper, unable to close. 2. M/E over speed trip simulator test, failure. 3. Canned food supplies in storage are out of date. 4. According all deficiencies ship ISM failure by: resources and personnel, shipboard operation, emergency preparedness.
Ship No. 19	Indonesia	Tanjung Priok	28-Jun-2020	12	1. Plan and procedures for recovery of person from the water, not available on board. 2. Master and crew are not familiar with SMS on board. 3. Based on deficiencies above ship ISM code failure by: resources and personal; emergency preparedness, shipboard operation, documentation.
Ship No. 20	Philippine	Subic Bay	29-Jun-2020	9	1. Hull damage impairing seaworthiness - stem below water line with crack and water ingress due to collision. 2. masters responsibility and authority - no appropriate remedial action for deficiency No. 1 as per res.A.1119 (30) sec 2.3.7.3 and 2.3.7.4.
Ship No. 21	Russia	Runjk - Nakhodka	30-Jun-2020	10	1. In the present voyage exchange of ballast was carried out with violation of the ballast water management convention and ballast water management plan (within 50 nm from the nearest land) (ballast water was uptaken in China and discharged overboard in the port of Nakhodka, Russia). 2. Accomodation interior stairway fire protection self-closing doors (Upper deck, A-deck) found out-of-order. 3. Above shown deficiencies are objective evidence of a failure, or lack of effectiveness of the implementation of the ISM.
Ship No. 22	Australia	Gladstone	30-Jun-2020	14	1. The SMS does not ensure effective implementation of procedures and instructions for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of personnel, ship and environment, as evidenced by deficiencies 1-7.
Ship No. 23	China	Zhangjiagang	5-Jul-2020	11	1. The steering gear malfunction three times during unberthing. Caused collision accident. The reason not found until PSC inspection. 2. Evidence (No.1 deficiency) indicate that ship hazard improper disposal cause collision.
Ship No. 24	USA	Mobile - Alabama	10-Jul-2020	8	1. For maintaining and monitoring the effectiveness of the fire safety measures the ship is required with, the following functional requirements shall be met: fire protection systems and firefighting systems shall be maintained ready for use. PSCO observed rags stuffed into all of the sprinkler heads of the fixed water sprinkling firefighting system in the paint locker, rendering the system inoperable and unable to comply with intended use. Additionally, PSCO observed flammable liquids stowed above the sprinkler heads, out of protection of the fixed firefighting system. 2. For maintaining and monitoring the effectiveness of the fire safety measures the ship is required with, the following functional requirements shall be met: fire protection systems and firefighting systems shall be maintained ready for use. PSCO observed a fixed carbon dioxide firefighting system nozzle in the lower level of the engine room was clogged and unable to comply with its intended use, rendering the space nearest the crankcase of the slow-speed diesel engine without adequate carbon dioxide extinguishing agent in event of activation. 3. Means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids and ignition sources shall be separated from combustible materials and flammable liquids. PSCO observed insufficiently clean engine room: excessive amount of oily-water mixture in bilge rendering one high level alarm inoperable, large number of oily rags tossed throughout including on fuel oil pumps and main engine cylinder tops, improperly stowed and unlabeled chemicals placed on the deck or adjacent to a heat source, and open containers of oil observed haphazardly arranged throughout the engine room, including near running engines and areas of high heat.
Ship No. 25	USA	Newport News - Virginia	10-Jul-2020	7	1. Oil fuel pipes fitted with valves directly on the tank shall be capable of being closed from outside the space. Found quick closing valve on stbd HFO tk incapable of being closed.
Ship No. 26	Canada	Vancouver	14-Jul-2020	9	1. Life boat engine - not operational.
Ship No. 27	Australia	Abbot Point	20-Jul-2020	20	1. Sewage treatment plant has no filtering medium inside unit & scour air valve #(6) was opened normally closed.
Ship No. 28	Ukraine	Chornomorsk	21-Jul-2020	12	1. During approaching berth at Chornomorsk on 21 Jul 2020, under pilotage with two tugs, vessel's bow thruster was overload and tripped at 0635 LT. After investigation and resetting the breaker, the bow thruster was back to normal but the pilot don't use the thruster anymore. The vessel was manoeuvred safely with tugs until alongside.
Ship No. 29	Australia	Dampler	23-Jul-2020	16	1. Emergency fire pump unable to pressurise fire mains
Ship No. 30	Australia	Sydney	28-Jul-2020	8	1. Unapproved eight tier of 40 feet High cube containers loaded at bay 50. Unapproved sixth tier 40 feet of high cube containers loaded at bay 14. 2. Five heavy over light containers loaded 09, 11, & 19. Numerous heavy container loaded on fifth to eight tiers between bays 01-078. 3. SMS fails to ensure effective implementation of key ship board procedures for container stowage concerning safety of ship and environment as evident by deficiencies 1-3.

Ship No. 31	Belgium	Antwerp	28-Jul-2020	10	<p>1. No valid flag endorsement could be shown for the 4th engineer, only a copy of the flag endorsement (issued on 10 January 2020) was available during inspection. (Date of observation is 28 July 2020).</p> <p>2. Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code.</p> <p>3. 2 crew on board for more than 15 months &amp; 17 days, 2 crew on board for more than 12 months &amp; 16 days &amp; 4 crew on board for more than 11 months &amp; 26 days. Crew not planned to be repatriated from Antwerp, Belgium. (Master, 2/E, 3/E, O/S, D/C, 2 Oilers, E/C) Due to the far exceeded periods on board for several crewmembers repatriation is imposed at Antwerp.</p> <p>4. Found cooling pump/system for R/B engine not working. Rescue boat engine could not be set in neutral position again after it was set in FWD.</p> <p>5. According to masters inspection reports the gallery and pantry is in good condition. Situation like found in galley is different: Excessive amount of grease present in stove hood (fire risk!); Floor dirty: especially beneath cupboards and other equipment, Stove dirty: Water from tap leaking on the floor; Found uncovered food in freezer and fridge (including meat); light in staircase leading from galley to provision stores not working.</p> <p>6. Several ventilation closing devices (mush room type) for example, not limited to: on poop deck steering gear room found in open "frozen" condition/very hard to move. Cover is not moving but spindle is being turned out and indicator shaft is not moving.</p> <p>7. Some selfclosing fire doors in main vertical stage not closing properly. Day lock not working. On previous PSC inspection at South Shields, UK. Dated 2/06/2019, this deficiency has been imposed and is still actual.</p> <p>8. On maindeck, main fire line between facing accommodation and cargo hold N5, no evidence two isolating valves are functioning properly (Supply ER and main deck line). In ER, lower floor, Fwd PS, iwo Escape trunk, found 2 valves on Main fire line frozen. At next PSC inspection, proper function of all fire pumps to be demonstrated in conjunction with use of isolating valves.</p> <p>9. Tap water is dirty in hospital, in several crew cabins and on drinking fountain. Not in every crew cabin hot tap water is (sufficiently) available. Found sink drain in public bathroom (A-deck) heavily leaking. Evidence of water leakage in laundry room.</p> <p>10. Found the emergency generator and ESB cannot work in auto mode. Therefore the UMS has been suspended and a conditional SAFCON certificate has been issued dated 27/07/2020. During this inspection on 28/07/2020, this emergency generator has been put in manual service and was tested under load. From the beginning no stable frequency has been observed and after approximate 20 minutes this engine could not deliver sufficient power any more.</p> <p>11. Opening of remote controlled valve of dewatering system in fore castle store (PS water supply to ejector) could not be shown. When the remote was activated hydraulic oil leakage was observed and the position of the valve remained unchanged.</p> <p>12. Found floor in fore castle store covered with oil and oil in PS &amp; SB bilges. Excessive amount of oil is stored in fore castle store and hydraulic leakage was</p>
Ship No. 32	Australia	Newcastle, NSW	30-Jul-2020	4	1. The above deficiencies are objective evidences that the Company has failed to ensure Seafarers Employment and Social Rights under Article IV, MLC 2006.
Ship No. 33	Australia	Port Adelaide	4-Aug-2020	10	1. Freefall Lifeboat engine - both starting sources failed and lifeboat not ready for immediate use.
Ship No. 34	Belgium	Gent	7-Aug-2020	9	<p>1. Seafarers' employment agreement (SEA)-Expired. All crew but one on board since 03.07.2019 with further extensions signed until nov/2020. No communication with Hong Kong Flag State available about extending SEAS and further conditions thereto as included in Hong Kong MD Circular Letter of 31.07.2020. Next port is not fixed. Evidence was found that onsigning crew is ready in China but shipowner opts to not carry out crew change in Ghent because there is "no time".</p> <p>2. Cert for personnel on survival craft &amp; rescue boat-Expired. "Proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats other than fast rescue boats"(STCW A-VII/2) expired since 2018 for crew members Chan Juyou and Li Daxiong. No evidence of grant of extension of certificate by Flag State.</p> <p>3. Non-payment of wages-Not according SEA. For several crewmembers, found that the wage totals on the wage accounts are less than the wage totals as agreed in the SEAs.</p> <p>4. ISM-Not as required. Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiencies marked ISM are objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code.</p>
Ship No. 35	Russia	Novorossiysk	9-Aug-2020	15	1. Voyage data recorder (VDR)/Simplified Voyage data recorder(S-VDR)/VDR FLOAT FREE CAPSULE CONNECTION FAILURE, NO RECORDS
Ship No. 36	Australia	Bunbury	18-Aug-2020	10	1. The SMS, as implemented onboard fails to ensure the vessel is effectively maintained as evidenced by defects 1,2,4,6,9,10-12,15 and 16.
Ship No. 37	Japan	Nigata	24-Aug-2020	9	1. SEA of 6 crew members (3/O,3/E,4/E1,4/E2,AB2, AB3) - Expired and Company didn't take necessary measures as per Circular issued by Hong Kong Government on 31 July 2020. (Extension of Crew Agreement Service Period in response to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic (2020.7.31) (AB2 have been on board for over 16 months. 3/E have been on board for over 14 months. 3/O and 4/E1 have been on board for over 11 months. 4/E2 and AB3 will be on board for over 11 months during next voyage.)
Ship No. 38	Australia	Gladstone	21-Sep-2020	15	<p>1. Majority Securing means for hatch covers defective; numerous hatch cover rubber packings &amp; channels defective; most hatch covers' stopper device seized, several stopper pins deformed; hatch covers' associated structures extensively corroded.</p> <p>2. SMS as implemented does not ensure that shipboard critical equipment and systems being maintained as evidenced by above deficiencies.</p>
Ship No. 39	Australia	Adelaide	1-Oct-2020	5	1. Both Starting Sources Failed and freefall lifeboat not ready for immediate use.
Ship No. 40	Belgium	Antwerp	1-Oct-2020	12	<p>1. Machinery controls alarm - Several alarms for Alarm Monitoring system found faded-out since 05/03/2020. Several other control alarms in fade-out mode.</p> <p>2. UMS - alarms - LT FW Temperature Control - fade out - since 30/06/2020. Controller out of order since first E-mail concerning defect LTFW controller dated 2011. Ships requisition for new controller dated 13/01/2017. Again requisition on 18/11/19 with remark WO Findings - LT Controller to be enlisted in NS5 and subsequently requested -. LT cooling water temperature to be adjusted manually at all moments - NO UMS. Nor class, nor flag informed about situation.</p> <p>3. Closing devices/watertight doors - The watertight (WT) door indicating panel on the bridge is showing only 2 doors opened; during the inspection round found most of the WT doors in open position with disabled or inoperative limit switches.</p> <p>4. Machinery space openings - ER hatch (skylight) is missing several studs and nuts, some of the holes from the hatch cover are masked with tape and paint.</p> <p>5. Closing devices/watertight doors - Several hatch covers are excessively corroded in way of the rubber channel and closing handwheel, e.g. CH entrances, ER escape.</p> <p>6. Ventilators, air pipes, casings - Numerous ventilators on deck are damaged and corroded through, mainly ventilators leading to the cargo holds.</p> <p>7. Access / structural features (ship) - Numerous crossdeck platforms are heavily corroded, damaged or having sharp edges. Some defects identified on protective railing in cargo holds.</p> <p>8. Lashing material - Numerous container deck sockets are excessively corroded and/or deformed. Found cargo loaded on the affected sockets.</p> <p>9. Pilot ladders and hoist/pilot transfer arrangements - Pilot ladders are showing defects. Found several bolts on the pilot ladder reel support missing. Chain gear not adequately protected. The pilot ladder arrangement is not properly maintained and in some places severely corroded.</p> <p>10. Electrical installations in general - Numerous electric cables are not supported, cable supports broke off (corroded through). Several cable deck penetrations are corroded through. Several supports for switches on deck broke partly off.</p> <p>11. ISM - Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code.</p> <p>12. Personal equipment for fire safety - Firemen's outfit are not meeting the minimum engineering specifications. Latches and buttons on the suit are conducting heat to the inner side of the suit.</p> <p>13. Launching arrangements for survival craft - PS LB could not be hoisted after lowering. One of the sheaves is not moving during lowering. Cover on the</p>
Ship No. 41	Canada	Vancouver	12-Oct-2020	7	1. Some of officers and crew's seafarer employment agreement has expired.
Ship No. 42	Indonesia	Tanjung Priok	20-Oct-2020	19	<p>1. Life saving appliances/Lifeboats/Port side life boat propeller, stuck.</p> <p>2. Emergency systems/Emergency source of power - Emergency generator/Emergency generator, unable to start/test.</p> <p>3. Fire safety/Fire doors/Openings in fire-resisting divisions/Fire door entrance to engine room (A60) and Escape trunk door at lower deck, broken.</p>
Ship No. 43	Indonesia	Tanjung Priok	22-Oct-2020	10	<p>1. Rescue boat, unable to start.</p> <p>2. Rescue boat david mechanical power not ready for use in emergency situation.</p> <p>3. Fire door entrance to engine room (A60), Engine room to steering room(A60), broken.</p> <p>4. Sewage Treatment Plant, out of order.</p> <p>5. Auto start emergency generator, failure test.</p> <p>6. Air ventilation for engine room, port side and starboard side, can not closed.</p> <p>7. According all deficiencies ship ISM Code failure by ; Safety and environment Policy; Resources and personnel; Shipboard Operation; Emergency Preparedness.</p>
Ship No. 44	Belgium	Ghent	29-Oct-2020	9	1. Seafarers' employment agreement (SEA)-3 crew on board since 15/09/19 (on date of PSC inspection crew 13 months and 14 days on board), 4 crew on board since 15/11/19 (on date of PSC inspection crew 11 months and 14 days on board). As per HK CBA the leaves per month is 7 days/ Contracts (SEA) of crew are 10 months. Maximum stay on board is 9 months and 8 days. Vessel was in China on 5th of July were several crew were changed. Vessel was in Singapore on 01/08/20. In those 2 ports SEA were already expired. Crew extension contracts on board for 3 months till January 2021. (=16 months)
Ship No. 45	Russia	Novorossiysk	3-Nov-2020	18	1. Emergency Fire Pump not ready for use
Ship No. 46	Australia	Newcastle	4-Nov-2020	14	1. Hatch cover clamping devices not properly maintained. Unable to be engaged (numerous places) including critical locations - cargo holds 1, 2 & 3.
Ship No. 47	Bangladesh	Chattogram	7-Nov-2020	10	<p>1. SVDR is inoperative.</p> <p>2. BNWAS is inoperative.</p> <p>3. Rescue boat engine is inoperative.</p> <p>4. Life boat lowering gears and arrangements are wasted, could not lower the life boat.</p> <p>5. Accommodation toilets, water supply, sanitary and drainage system are out of order.</p> <p>6. Cargo Ship Safety Radio cert. expired.</p> <p>7. Labour conditions - Accom, recreational facilities, food and catering are very poor, MLC not complied.</p> <p>8. Sewage plant is inoperative.</p>
Ship No. 48	Ukraine	Pivdennyi	8-Nov-2020	4	1. Collecting sewage to grey water tank which is not certified. Piping diagram not approved by recognized organization.
Ship No. 49	Australia	Dampier	9-Nov-2020	6	<p>1. Engine room fire damper number 3 and number 4 defective.</p> <p>2. Rescue boat engine, not operational.</p>

Ship No. 50	USA	Houston	13-Nov-2020	11	1. Ships shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and of part A of the ISPS Code. At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out, through appropriate measures, on all ships in order to identify and take preventative measures against security incidents: controlling access to the ship, the embarkation of persons and their effects, and supervising the handling of cargo. PSCO observed a technical from Valmet had not been signed in on the ship's sign in log as referenced in copy of the log. The duty AB had no explanation as to why he was not signed in and could not provide how many stevedores were on board. The technician reported on board at 0745. The technician had a large tool bag in his possession that had not been searched. The technician reported that the ship's crew did not record his information or check his ID when he came on board. The Captain and Chief Officer both could not verify, from the ship's stevedore log, how many stevedores were on board. No identification badges for visitors or workers were being utilized. Ship's crew stated 17, 18, 11 and finally 15 stevedores were on board, while the log reflected 10. While the PSCO discussed the log with the Captain and Chief Officer, the stevedores began to depart the vessel for the 1200 shift change. Ship's crew then reported that there were only 2 stevedores remaining on board. PSCO then witnessed 4 stevedores depart the vessel, contrary to the aforementioned report of only 2 stevedores remaining. Based on above deficiency, an external verification of the ISSC is required. This external verification should focus on access/embarkation control and monitoring of persons and activities performing work on the ship and how implementation of the Ship's Security Plan contributed to the lack of access/embarkation and monitoring control.
Ship No. 51	Canada	Vancouver	19-Nov-2020	8	1. Emergency fire pump non functional. Noticed that approx. after one hour at emergency station emergency fire pump and Bilge, fire and G/S indicators lights on, displaying pumps running. Upon further checking noticed that emergency fire pump non functional, unable to take suction. Crew tried to prime it with portable water bottles by filling the attached suction pump pot but unable to make it functional. Smoke coming from the attached suction pump pot. Expansion bellows at fire line leaking.
Ship No. 52	Indonesia	Tanjung Priok	2-Dec-2020	11	1. Fire door entrance to E/R (A-60), Broken.
Ship No. 53	Belgium	Antwerpen	4-Dec-2020	21	1. Second means of start, hydraulic starter for emergency generator not able to be pumped to desired pressure. Oil level to low. Oil leakage observed on this device. Oil spill on floor. Luckily the generator could be started with available pressure. 2. Several valves (QCV) directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which such tanks are situated not closing. Not closing by manual operating actuator piston. Air actuator system found leaking and not functioning. Additionally found spring loaded valve on level gauge permanent blocked in open position by device. 3. Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code.
Ship No. 54	Australia	Melbourne	10-Dec-2020	5	1. Emergency generator defective and not being tested monthly as per manufacturers requirements.
Ship No. 55	Australia	Bunbury	14-Dec-2020	15	1. With reference to above deficiency no. 2 and 4 - 6, simulated safety full body harness demonstrations and fatal work at height incident on 11 December 2020, these are objective evidence the Company's safety management system as implemented onboard failed to ensure effective and relevant high risk work specific training and operations procedure are provided onboard, including maintenance of associated equipment for safe ship operations.
Ship No. 56	Canada	Trois Rivieres	17-Dec-2020	6	1. Voyage or passage plan-Passage plan did not include Under Keel Clearance calculation nor over head clearance. To be included on passage plans from now on. 2. Embarkation arrangement survival craft-At the time of inspection, both embarkation ladder forward are frozen in block of freezing spray and not ready for use. 3. Ready availability of fire fighting equipment-At the time of inspection, Forward fire hydrants were stuck with ice and not ready for use. 4. Dangerous areas-At the time of inspection, forward mooring station and its access was covered with ice without any abrasive (salt/sand). 5. Steering gear-At the time of inspection, several hydraulic leaks observed on steering gear and its hydraulic power pack. 6. Launching arrangements for rescue boats-At the time of inspection, when requested to swing out the davit under stored power, crew was unable to do it. Final demonstration took 30 min and huge oil spill before the davit swing out. Lack of familiarity with equipment and its operation. 7. Insulation wetted through (oil)-At the time of inspection, boiler piping insulation covered with oil and a plastic bottle installed to collect the leaking oil. Fire hazard must be rectified, insulation renewed and plastic bottle removed before departure. 8. Cleanliness of engine room-Engine room in general lack of good house keeping and creates fire hazards: oily rags found in plastic bags near incinerator, unsecured open containers filled with oil found in several location in engine room. 9. Oil filtering equipment-At the time of inspection, when requested to test OWS 15 PPM alarm, the effluent was overflowing out of the drain pipe on engine room floor. OWS must be made fully operational before departure. 10. Auxiliary engine-During verification of previous PSC inspection outstanding defects, No1 and No 2 generator would only start in remote after several minutes and some crew members running around for opening starting air valves and fuel valves locally. Generators must be capable of starting in remote mode without local intervention. 11. ISM Related Deficiency-Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code. 12. Personal equipment-AT THE TIME OF INSPECTION, CREW ARE NOT PROVIDED WITH PROPER WINTER CLOTHING. EACH CREW MEMBER MUST BE PROVIDED WITH WINTER GLOVES, WINTER BOOTS, WINTER JACKETS AND BALAKLAVA OR EQUIVALENT WINTER GEARS BEFORE DEPARTURE.