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A. The Incident
1. At about 0450
hours on 6 March 1999, a People's Republic of China (PRC) container ship "Xing
Long" was involved in a collision with a PRC cargo ship "Quan Tai" in the position
220 15.95'N 1140 26.57'E, 4 miles east of Ninepin Group in restricted visibility.
Before the collision, "Xing Long" was steering a course of 2500T and at a speed
of about 8 knots whilst "Quan Tai" was steaming on a course of 0700T. At about
0425 hours the Chief Officer of "Xing Long" observed on the radar right ahead
at a range of 6 miles a ship (later known as "Quan Tai") nearly on a reciprocal
course. The Chief Officer of "Xing Long" wasted some valuable time to establish
contact to that unidentified ship by VHF radio but in vain. He then made a succession
of small alterations of course to starboard to avoid collision whilst "Quan
Tai" made an alteration of course to port. The two vessels collided in dense
fog ( see Appendix A ).
2. "Quan Tai"
sank after the collision while "Xing Long" sustained minor damage to her hull
on the port bow. Of the eight crew members on board " Quan Tai ", five died,
two survived and one crew member was reported missing ( see
Appendix B ).
B. Findings
1. "Xing Long"
and "Quan Tai" were meeting on nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk
of collision. "Xing Long" failed to maintain a proper lookout, use the radar
equipment properly to obtain early warning of risk of collision or to take proper
and effective action to avoid collision, and make a large alteration of course
to starboard and/or large reduction in speed in ample time to keep well clear
of "Quan Tai". In this respect, "Xing Long" failed to comply with Rules 5, 7,
and 8 of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 ( COLREGS
). The action taken to avoid collision "Xing Long", was delayed by paying too
much attention to the VHF radio call.
2."Quan Tai" also
failed to maintain a proper lookout, make use of radar equipment to obtain early
warning of risk of collision, give the appropriate sound signal in restricted
visibility and avoid making an alteration of course to port to prevent the collision
with "Xing Long". In this respect, "Quan Tai" failed to comply Rules 5, 7, 8,
19 and 35 of COLREGS.
3. The cause
of the sinking was not positively established but stability problem, loading
condition, and further aggravation by the heeling caused by the port turn and
shifting of cargo were the most probable causes.
C. The Lessons
1. Not maintaining
a proper lookout by all available means especially operational radar in fog
is considered to be the main cause of the collision. The obligations to maintain
a proper lookout as required by Rule 5 of the COLREGS is considered to be the
most important in the collision avoidance process. To ensure further actions
required by Rules 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 are complied with effectively,
it is essential that the responsibilities as required by Rule 5 are properly
implemented.
2. The use of
VHF radio in collision avoidance is not recommended because of the possible
wrong identification of vessel and interpretation of messages received. Also,
it may distract the attention of the watchkeeping officer. Valuable time can
be wasted while officers on vessels approaching each other try to make contact
on VHF radio instead of complying with the COLREGS.
3. The avoidance
of alteration of course to port in fog as indicated in Rule 19 for a vessel
forward of the beam is important. If an alteration of course is taken in the
collision avoidance, vessels should alter their course to starboard if the circumstance
of the case admits, as an alteration to port would form a contradictory action
to other vessel.
4. A succession of small alterations
of course to avoid collision should be avoided. As vessels are frequently using
the mode of relative motion on radar, a succession of small alteration of course
would not be readily apparent to other vessel observing by radar or visually
if in clear visibility [ Rule 8 (b) ].
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