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| Home > Publications and press releases > Reports of Marine Department > Reports & Statistics | ||||
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| Hong Kong-registered bulk carrier “Coral
Bulker”dragged Its anchor in Port of Viana do Castelo, Portugal and subsequently ran aground on 25 December 2000 |
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A. The Incident 1. At about 2323 hours on 25 December 2000, in good visibility but very rough seas and gale force wind, the Hong Kong-registered bulk carrier "Coral Bulker" dragged its anchor while awaiting berth at the outer anchorage of Port of Viana do Castelo, Portugal and ran aground in the approximate position 41° 40.88'N 008° 50.88'W, about 0.42 of a nautical mile (nm) off and bearing 327°T from Molhe Exterior Light. The vessel sustained serious damage to its bottom in way of the engine room, No.2 Fuel Oil Tank and No.4 Starboard Wing Bottom Tank. Consequently the engine room and No.4 Starboard Wing Bottom Tank were flooded. About 100-150 tonnes of oil leaked out and polluted the areas nearby. There was no injury to the crew in the incident. All crewmembers were evacuated to shore by a helicopter. Subsequently the vessel was declared a "Constructive Total Loss". B. Findings 1. The Master had received the weather forecast on arrival and experienced the deterioration of weather during the stay at the anchorage. Hence the Master was well aware of the developing adverse weather conditions. Little information was available on the chart regarding the nature of sea bottom off the breakwater. It was not known whether it is rocky, sandy, or a combination of mud or other materials at the anchorage. The Master was not aware of the seabed conditions. Hence it appeared that the Master was not concerned of the information about the sea bottom, which is important in assessing holding power of the anchors. 2. According to the information provided in the Sailing Directions, Port of Viana do Castelo is a commercial port susceptible to bad weather conditions. The anchorage area to the west of the breakwater is exposed to westerly wind and seas. The Master therefore should have been aware of the dangers of anchoring his vessel to a lee shore in winter in the North Atlantic waters. 3. Position monitoring was performed by the OOWs using radars and GPS. It seems the bridge resources were not fully utilized to monitor the anchor position. Although the OOWs claimed to have observed radar and GPS regularly, the position warning alarm provided on the GPS however had not been used. Such warning alarm would supplement manual observation and would avoid human error under these circumstances. Anchor position and radius of the swing circle could be entered into the GPS to activate the function. The system would then sound an alarm should the vesselˇs position move out of the set swing circle, thus relieving the stress on the OOWs in continuous position monitoring. 4. Although the Master had issued night orders to the officers and may have verbally warned the officers, he did not give specific instructions to the OOW to safeguard the vessel from anchor dragging and grounding. In view of the unfavourable situation while the vessel was at anchorage, instructions should have been given to remind OOWs the no-go areas on the charts, the unfavourable factors that the vessel was encountering and the measures to be taken. Had the Master laid down the specific instructions, the OOW might have exercised more care and caution, the dragging of anchor might have been detected earlier and grounding avoided. 5. Although the Master had ordered the engine to be maintained in a state of prompt readiness, he did not order the engineers to stand by the engine for emergency manoeuvring. He should have been aware that anchoring equipment was not designed to hold a vessel in position in very bad weather. The main engine could have been used to relieve the anchor from excessive stress. 6. "Coral Bulker" was a GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System) equipped vessel. It had a VHF radio, a Digital Selective Call (DSC) and Inmarsat facilities for safety information and distress alert. The Master was aware that VHF Channel 16 is a communication channel with the Port Control station. He had however not prepared beforehand other contact numbers or channels for other available facilities in case of emergency. As a result, shore assistance if urgently required, such as tug and fire brigade services etc., could not be requested through the radio stations immediately. 7. According to the statement given by the Third Officer, he found at some stage during his watch, time not indicated, that the vessel was only 0.5 nm away from the breakwater. He however did not call the Master nor take any other preventive action until 2230 hours when the vessel was only 0.2 nm from the breakwater. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that the Third Officer was not adequately alerted against the danger of grounding and did not properly monitor the anchor position in his watch. 8. According to the information from the Sailing Directions, Guide to Port Entry and Port of the World, there were powerful tugs available in the Port of Viana do Castelo. According to the statement given by the Master, he had tried well before the grounding to contact the Port Control station by VHF on Channel 16 for tug assistance. However he received no response from the Port Control station. According to the information from the Admiralty List of Radio Signals, the Port Control station would keep watch on Channel 16 only in the periods 0900 - 1200 and 1400 - 1700, whilst a 24 hours watch was maintained on Channel 11. Therefore the Master could not contact the Port Control station on Channel 16 when he tried to seek tug assistance. 9. As no other contact numbers or channels for other available facilities were prepared, the Master failed to contact the Port Control station by other available means such as Channel 11, the Digital Selective Call and the Inmarsat facilities. Had he succeeded in communication with the Port Control station or other radio stations at an earlier stage, tug assistance might have been available in good time to prevent the grounding. In this instance however the delay did not seem to have mattered as the tugs might not be able to proceed to the scene in the prevailing weather conditions. C. The Lessons 1. The investigation has attributed the loss of the vessel to the failure of fully appraise the potential danger in advance, failed to make early decision to alleviate such danger when the weather started to deteriorate and inadequate preparation under the worsening weather. Other contributing factors were the failure to keep proper anchor watch and did not make full use of the propulsion power in emergency situation which might have prevented the vessel from grounding. 
CORAL BULKER aground close to the breakwater at Viana do castello 
CORAL BULKER view on the aft ship taken from breakwater |
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